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in 1905. The testator knew of the adoption, and with other mem-
bers of the family joined in keeping it secret. In 1917 he drewhis will, creating a trust in favor of numerous relatives, includ-
ing Mrs. Childs, and in the event that she died before the termin-
ation of the trust, then to her "lawful issue or descendants".
Upjohn died that same year. Upon Mrs. Child's death in 1950,
before the termination of the trust, the trustees petitioned the
Surrogate Court to construe the will and determine whether or
not the adopted child was the "lawful issue or decendant" of
Mrs. Childs. The Surrogate held not, and the Appellate Division
affirmed.29 The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed. Judge
Fuld reasoned that the words "issue" and "descendants" could
not be construed in vacuo, but that their meaning must be determ-
ined in the light of the testator's intention as shown from the sur-
rounding circumstances. Testator knew of the adoption, and
treated the child with generosity and affection. He must have
realized that Mrs. Childs-over 40 years of age-would not likely
have any natural descendants. He was on intimate terms with
the Childs family, who frequently were his guests. And he was
an active partner in the pledge of secr.ecy. In the light of these
facts, Judge Fuld concluded, the only reasonable inference to
be deduced was that the testator in making his will intended that
the adopted child be considered the "issue" or "decendant" of
Mrs. Childs. Having determined the intention of the testator,
Judge Fuld went on to meet the objection raised by reason of
§115. He declared that the purpose of §115 was to prevent the
perpetration of fraud on the rights of the remaindermen through
an adoption for the very purpose of cutting of the remainder.
He then reasoned that there was no fraud to the remaindermen
if the testator intended the adopted child to limit their taking.
It is submitted that approach to §115 is the proper one, and that
the decision is in the best tradition of the court.
B. Personal Property
Bailments
The characterization of the relationship between a depositor
and a safe deposit company has produced some difference of
opinion in the courts throughout the United States. It has been
stated that the legal relation is that of bailor-bailee, 0 of licensor-
licensee,3' of landlord-tenant,3 2 and finally, a combination of all
29. 279 App. Div. 675, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 336 (2d Dep't 1951).
30. 6 Am. JuR. BAMMENTS, § 407.
31. 11 MINN. L. REv. 440 (1927).
32. VAN Zirm, BA X.LNTS AND CAPRmlS (2d. ed. 1908) § 196.
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three.13 Which relationship is choosen is material from the view-
point of result, when considered in the light of the burden of proof
in a suit by the depositor against the safe deposit company for
the disappearance of valuables contained in the safe deposit box.
If the relation is characterized as that of landlord-tenant, or
licensor-licensee, the depositor has a double burden: (1) of pre-
senting the evidence, and (2) of persuading the jury by a pre-
ponderance of that evidence that the defendant was negligent. 4 As
for the former, unless the plaintiff is aided by a presumption,
thereby shifting to the defendant the duty of presenting evidence,
he is unfairly handicapped 5 The reason for this is that knowl-
edge of what happened to the contents of the safe deposit box is
ordinarily the defendant's, and any attempt by the plaintiff to
uncover it would be frustrated by the reluctance of defendant's
employees to testify. Consequently, unless the plaintiff can seek
the aid of some presumption, he has little chance of recovery.3 6
It is submitted that there are no tailor-made presumptions avail-
able to the plaintiff in the safe deposit situation. Res ipsa loqui-
tur requires that exclusive control be in the defendant 7  In the
safe deposit relation, the depositor has a measure of control.
Accordingly, if the relation is characterized as landlord-tenant,
etc., the result is that the depositor has little chance of recovery.
But if the relationship is characterized as that of bailor-
bailee, this hardship is removed, for it is a common law rule that
upon failure of the bailee to account for goods in his possession,
a presumption of negligence arises.38 Appropriately enough, the
reason for this rule is that the bailee is in a better position than
the bailor to explain how the loss occurred.
But there is a difference of opinion as to the effect of this
common law presumption. Some courts hold that it shifts to the
defendant the burden of presenting the evidence and the burden
of persuading the jury by a preponderance of the evidence of the
defendant's freedom from negligence. 9 The effect of this second
33. Doam, BAn mqs Am C~AMs § 67.
34. 9 WGmOE, EvmDEaxc (3rd. ed. 1940) §§ 2485-2487.
35. BRowN, PE~soNAL PR PERY § 87.
36. BRowN, op. cit., supra n. 35.
37. Possma, ToRTs .§ 43.
38. Do I, op. cit., supra n. 33, § 17.
39. McDonald v. Win. D. Perkins and Co., 133 Wash. 622, 234 Pac. 456 (1925);
Security Storage and Trust Co. v. Martin, 144 Md. 536, 125 At. 449 (1924); Cussen
v. So. California Savings Bank, 133 Cal. 534,. 65 Pac. 1099 (1901).
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burden is to establish the defendant as negligent, and to require
him to disprove it. But in order to accomplish the latter, the safe
deposit company must first explain the disappearance and then
show that it was through no fault of its own. In those cases in
which the defendant is unable to explain the disappearance, it is
never completely able to exonerate itself from negligence. Con-
sequently, it can never be said as a matter of law that the defend-
ant was not negligent, so as to obtain a directed verdict. 40
Other courts hold that the effect of the presumption is merely
to shift to the defendant the burden of presenting evidence, and
that the burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff.41
Following this view, the safe deposit company is considered to
have satisfied the presumption when it introduces evidence show-
ing that its degree of care conforms to the standard followed
by similar institutions throughout the community.42 At that point,
the burden of introducing evidence shifts back to the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff then rests his case, may the judge direct a verdict
for the defendant?
That precise question was taken to the Court of Appeals in
Viehlnan v. Manufacturers Safe Deposit Co.43 The plaintiff, a
business woman of 69 years of age and of a very good reputation,
rented one of defendant's safe deposit boxes. In her complaint
she alleged that $10,000 which she had deposited had disappeared
from her box. At the trial, defendant introduced evidence as to
the construction of the vault, the various anti-burglar devices used
by it and similar concerns, the care and management exercised in
the vault's operation, and as to the trustworthy background of
the vault's hand-picked custodian and his assistant. At the close
of the evidence, the trial court granted defendant's motion for
a directed verdict. 4 The Appellate Division unanimously affirm-
ed.4 5 The Court of Appeals reversed (4-3), Chief Judge Loughran
writing for the majority, Judge Desmond for the dissent.
Chief Judge Loughran stated that the evidence showed de-
positors had on occasion been admitted without showing identifi-
40. Security Storage and Trust Co. v. Martin, sup4ra n. 39; McDonald v. Win, D.
Perkins & Co.- 4pra n. 39.
41. Koczora v. Standard Safe Deposit Co., 221 II App. 43 (1921) ; Bohmont v.
Moore, 138 Neb. 784, 295 N. W. 414 (1940) ; Schmidt v. Twin City Bank, 151 Kan.
667, 100 P. 2d 652 (1940); Shaefer v. Washington Safe Deposit Co., 281 IML 43, 117
N. E. 781 (1917).
42. See cases cited supra n. 41.
43. 303 N. Y. 526, 104 N. E. 2d 888 (1952).
44. 198 Misc. 861, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
45. 278 App. Div. 685, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 833 (1st Dep't 1951).
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cation, that no record was kept of the people who came in or went
out, that ordinarily only one employee was present to care for
over 1900 boxes in the vault, and reasoned that from this evi-
dence fair minded men could draw more than one inference. Con-
sequently, the question of negligence should have been left to the
jury.
Judge Desmond for the dissent stated that the relation be-
tween the safe deposit company and its depositor is not that of
bailor-bailee, because the safe deposit company did not have ex-
clusive possession over the contents of the box. Consequently,
the plaintiff was not entitled to the presumption of negligence.
Without the presumption, plaintiff had failed to state a cause of
action, because she had failed to show any causal connection be-
tween defendant's alleged negligence and the disappearance.
Hence, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict.
It is submitted that the characterization of Judge Desmond,
theoretically speaking, is true. But in the light of practical re-
sults, characterizing the relation as one of bailment achieves a
just and fair solution of a unique problem. It shifts the burden
of producing evidence to the defendant. Any other characteri-
zation would compel the depositor to sue on general negligence
principles, and since there is no available legal device to permit
the shifting of the burden to the defendant the result would
ordinarily be to deny recovery.
The opinion of the majority, by declaring that the question of
negligence was for the jury, has established a precedent for sim-
ilar fact situations, and to that extent defined the standard of
care for safe deposit companies. 6
IX. ToRTs
The law of torts must effect a reasonable compromise between
conflicting interests, marking out the limits of permissible invasion
of one man's interests by another. The courts in the development
of the common law have been guided by and have often expressly
referred to, "public policy" as the final standard of justice.: Tort
law being primaily non-statutory, its growth and development
depend on the temperament of any given court. The exigency of
adhering to past rules or precedents may conflict with a just dis-
position of the case before the court. The 1951-1952 term of the
New York Court of Appeals illustrates the successful adjusting of
46. See PRossER, supra n. 37, § 41.
1. Pound, Interests in Personality, 28 H.Av. L. REv. 343 (1915).
